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NO PLACE TO CALL HOME: RETHINKING 
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR  
SEX OFFENDERS 
GINA PULS* 
Abstract: Modern day sex offender legislation was first implemented in the early 
1990s in response to a number of headline-grabbing incidents. Seeking to protect 
families and children, federal and state legislators passed regulations aimed at 
tracking, monitoring, and controlling released sex offenders. A key portion of these 
legislative developments include state and local level residency restrictions, which 
prevent sex offenders from living within an established distance—usually 1000 to 
2500 feet—of various places where children gather, such as schools and daycare 
facilities. These laws have created enormous hardship for released sex offenders as 
they attempt to reintegrate into society, and the effectiveness of these laws has in-
creasingly been rejected. This Note argues for the implementation of more sensible 
sex offender legislation, including prioritizing individualized assessments over 
blanket restrictions, making an exception to allow offenders to live with family, and 
providing resources to help offenders comply with restrictions. Sex offender legis-
lation based upon false assumptions should no longer be the norm, and these re-
forms will help balance the goals of sex offender management with the empirical 
data about offender reintegration. 
INTRODUCTION 
“If a person wants to offend, it doesn’t matter how close he is to a conven-
ient place to find kids.”1 
Starting in 2013, the railroad tracks in the area of NW 36th Court and NW 
71st Street in Florida’s Miami-Dade County became notorious for all of the 
wrong reasons.2 The area has received a great amount of media attention be-
cause it has become a homeless encampment for a number of sex offenders 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 
Feet From Danger or One Step from Absurd?, 49 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOL-
OGY 168, 174 (2005). In a study seeking to describe the impact of residency restrictions on sex offend-
ers, one offender offered this opinion in regards to the perceived effectiveness of such legislation. See 
id. at 168, 174. 
 2 Amended Complaint for Petitioners at 9, Doe v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 14-CV-23933 (S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 20, 2014); see Charles Rabin et al., Sex Offenders Forced from Allapattah Trailer Park, 
Now in Hialeah, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 8, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/community/miami-dade/article1953953.html [http://perma.cc/F3MC-E9MD]. 
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who have been unable to find otherwise appropriate housing.3 The “residents” 
of this encampment, estimated to total more than fifty individuals, include 
three men who filed suit in October 2014 against the county and various other 
defendants in Doe v. Miami-Dade County, seeking a permanent injunction 
against a local housing ordinance thought to be the catalyst for the develop-
ment of the encampment.4 All three men are convicted sex offenders who have 
been under the supervision of the Florida Department of Corrections 
(“FDOC”).5 Upon their release, each was directed to the area surrounding NW 
36th Court and NW 71st Street by his probation officer.6 This encampment 
does not contain housing, sanitation facilities, or potable water, yet it still re-
ceived approval as the “residence” of all three men by their respective proba-
tion officers.7 
The ordinance at issue in the suit is Miami-Dade County’s Lauren Book 
Child Safety Ordinance (the “Book Ordinance”), which prohibits former sex 
offenders from living within 2500 feet of any building the county labels a 
school.8 As a 2014 National Public Radio (NPR) story covering the encamp-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Charles Rabin, ACLU Sues Over Rule on Where Sex Offenders Can Live in Miami-Dade, 
MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 23, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/
miami-dade/article3329717.html [http://perma.cc/L367-QRJ2]. 
 4 See Complaint for Petitioner, Doe v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 1:14-cv-23933 (S.D. Fla. Oct 23, 
2014); Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 1, 2; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Challenges Miami-
Dade Housing Restriction Forcing Former Sex Offenders to Live by Railroad Tracks (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/aclu-challenges-miami-dade-housing-restriction-forcing-
former-sex-offenders-live [https://perma.cc/U6PR-A95Y]. In addition to “John Doe #1,” “John Doe 
#2,” and “John Doe #3,” the Florida Action Committee (“FAC”) is also a named plaintiff in the case. 
Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 6, 7. According to the amended complaint, FAC is “a non-
profit corporation that works to reform the sex offender laws in Florida . . . . [Its] mission is to educate 
the media, legislators, and the public with the facts surrounding sex offender laws.” Id. at 7. The plain-
tiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Id. at 26. The named defendants 
include Miami-Dade County, the Florida Department of Corrections (the “FDOC”), and Sunny 
Ukenye, Circuit Administrator for the Miami Circuit Office for the FDOC. Id. at 8. 
 5 Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 6. 
 6 Id. at 4, 5, 6. 
 7 Id. at 1, 4, 5, 6. 
 8 The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
ch. 21, art. XVII, §§ 21-277 to -285 (2010); see Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 1, 15. The Book 
Ordinance applies to individuals convicted of the following crimes involving victims under age six-
teen: sexual battery, lewd and lascivious acts upon or in the presence of persons under age sixteen, 
sexual performance by a child, sexual acts transmitted over a computer, and the selling or buying of 
minors for portrayal in sexually explicit conduct. The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance § 21-
281(a). The ordinance defines “school” as a “public or private kindergarten, elementary, middle or 
secondary (high) school.” Id. § 21-280(9). The Book Ordinance is named for Lauren Book, who was 
subject to over five years of sexual abuse at the hands of her nanny, beginning at age eleven. See Su-
san Donaldson James, Nanny-Rape Victim Fights for Homeless Predators, ABC NEWS (Oct. 12, 
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/sex-abuse-victim-advocates-homeless-
molesters-miami/story?id=8793505 [http://perma.cc/HXD7-6VK4]. Following the discovery of the 
abuse, Lauren’s father Ron Book became an outspoken and relentless lobbyist in the area of sex of-
fender legislation. See Catharine Skipp, The Lobbyist Who Put Sex Offenders Under a Bridge, 
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ment explained, the Book Ordinance prevents released sex offenders from liv-
ing in “almost every neighborhood in the county.”9 The three plaintiffs in the 
suit, identified only as “John Doe #1,” “John Doe #2,” and “John Doe #3,” did, 
in fact, have other housing options that would provide a roof over their heads, 
but these residences were deemed ineligible as they did not fall outside the 
2500-foot “buffer zone” created by the Book Ordinance.10 
Plaintiff “John Doe #1” is a mentally disabled man in his mid-fifties and a 
registered sex offender in Miami-Dade County.11 After his release from prison 
in January 2014, he struggled to find housing that complied with the Book Or-
dinance; as a result, he took up residence along the railroad tracks in the area 
of NW 36th Court and NW 71st Street in Miami-Dade County.12 Also living at 
this location from January to September 2014 was “John Doe #2,” a convicted 
sex offender in his late forties who was released from prison in January 2014.13 
“John Doe #3,” a sex offender in his fifties, although employed, still has been 
unable to locate affordable and lawful housing under the statute, and thus has 
also been forced to live near the encampment since March 2014, sleeping in 
his vehicle.14 
The experiences of these plaintiffs are far from unique.15 Beginning in the 
mid-1990s, many states began enacting residency restrictions that prohibited 
sex offenders from residing within a certain distance—typically between 1000 
to 2000 feet—of designated areas where children were likely to congregate.16 
                                                                                                                           
NEWSWEEK (Jul. 24, 2009, 8:00 PM), www.newsweek.com/lobbyist-who-put-sex-offenders-under-
bridge-81755 [http://perma.cc/D973-KNLX]. Mr. Book’s efforts brought a significant amount of 
media attention to Lauren’s case in order to garner support for the implementation of municipal level 
residency restrictions in the Miami area and beyond. See Jill Levenson, Sex Offender Residence Re-
strictions, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 267, 272 (Richard G. Wright 
ed., 2009); Skipp, supra. 
 9 Greg Allen, ACLU Challenges Miami Law on Behalf of Homeless Sex Offenders, NPR (Oct. 23, 
2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/23/358354377/aclu-challenges-miami-law-on-behalf-of-
homeless-sex-offenders [http://perma.cc/F6UX-32FU]. 
 10 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3, 5, 6. 
 11 Id. at 3. 
 12 See id. at 4. 
 13 Id. at 4–5. 
 14 Id. at 6. 
 15 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 279–80. 
 16 See id. at 268; Karen J. Terry & Alissa R. Ackerman, A Brief History of Major Sex Offender 
Laws, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 8, at 65, 82–85; see 
also GA CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2014) (“[N]o individual [who is required to register under the state’s 
sexual offender registry] shall reside within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, school, or 
area where minors congregate . . . [nor] shall be employed by or volunteer at any child care facility, 
school, or church or by or at any business or entity that is located within 1,000 feet of a child care 
facility, a school, or a church . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 590 (2014) (“It is unlawful for any person 
registered pursuant to the Sex Offenders Registration Act to reside, either temporarily or permanently, 
within a two-thousand-foot radius of any public of private school site, educational institution, property 
or campsite used by an organization whose primary purpose is working with children, a playground or 
park . . . or licensed child care center . . . .”). 
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By 2010, thirty states had adopted such restrictions.17 In addition to state level 
restrictions, municipalities began imposing even more burdensome local re-
strictions.18 In 2005, Miami Beach, Florida became the first municipality in the 
country to pass a local residency restriction ordinance and, by 2010, more than 
one hundred and fifty local ordinances had been passed in Florida alone.19 
Proponents of residency restrictions maintain that these policies increase 
public safety and reduce recidivism rates by prohibiting sex offenders from 
residing near places frequented by children, thus reducing opportunities for sex 
offenders to interact with potential victims.20 Scholars in the field, however, 
frequently cite the lack of empirical data supporting the effectiveness of such 
policies, and note the negative consequences that may result from restrictions 
on residency.21 These policies may ultimately prevent offenders from success-
fully reintegrating into society, and may in fact lead to higher recidivism 
rates.22 
This Note discusses the background of modern sex offender legislation in 
the United States and the implementation of state and local level residency re-
strictions, and advocates for sensible legislation, grounded in empirical data. 
Part I examines the driving forces behind the development of modern sex of-
fender legislation and explains the legal context of Doe v. Miami-Dade County. 
Part I also provides examples of the various legal challenges that residency 
restrictions have faced across the country. Part II describes the false assump-
tions that underlie residency restriction legislation and the significant impact 
such policies have on offenders. This section also explains how residency re-
strictions function in practice. Part III describes alternative options and the ap-
proaches of states that have rejected blanket residency restrictions. Part III also 
argues for the implementation of more sensible legislation for released sex of-
fenders based on empirical data, including individualized assessments and ex-
ceptions to allow released offenders to live with family members. 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Paul Zandbergen et al., Residential Proximity to Schools and Daycares: An Empirical 
Analysis of Sex Offense Recidivism, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 482, 482 (2010). 
 18 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 270–71. 
 19 See id. at 270; Zandbergen et al., supra note 17, at 486. The 2005 Miami Beach ordinance 
prohibited sex offenders convicted of certain crimes and whose victims were under the age of sixteen 
from establishing residence “within 2500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, day 
care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate.” CITY OF MIAMI 
BEACH, FLA., CODE art. VI, § 70-402(a) (2005), repealed by The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordi-
nance, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 21, art. XVII, § 21-279(b) (2010). 
 20 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 278; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 88. 
 21 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 278–80; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 88. 
 22 See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, JUSTICE PERVERTED: SEX OFFENDER LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (2011); Levenson & Cotter, supra note 1, at 169. 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN DAY SEX OFFENDER  
LEGISLATION & LEGAL CHALLENGES 
Modern day sex offender legislation in general was implemented in the 
early 1990s, often in response to high-profile sexual offense cases that in-
volved children.23 Specifically, residency restrictions for sex offenders stem 
from the 1994 federal enactment of the Jacob Wetterling Act (“Wetterling 
Act”), which was passed in response to the 1989 abduction of eleven-year-old 
Jacob Wetterling.24 A masked man abducted Jacob at gunpoint as he biked 
home from a convenience store with his brother and a friend in St. Joseph, 
Minnesota.25 Although Jacob was never found, it is believed that the perpetra-
tor was a sex offender residing in a halfway house in Jacob’s town.26 In the 
aftermath of Jacob’s abduction, his parents, Jerry and Patricia Wetterling, es-
tablished the Jacob Wetterling Foundation in order to help prevent and better 
respond to child abductions, and became advocates for new legislation to track 
the personal information of sex offenders.27 The Wetterlings maintained that 
efforts to find their son might have been more successful if law enforcement 
had been able to access a database of registered sex offenders who resided in 
the area at the time.28 
Jacob’s abduction and the Wetterling’s resulting crusade served to intensi-
fy “stranger-danger” rhetoric and public panic over sexual offenses against 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 65, 74. High profile cases often cited and used to 
justify such legislation include, “the abduction and murder of Adam Walsh in Florida; the abduction 
and presumed murder of Johnny Gosh in Iowa . . . the abduction and presumed sexual assault and 
murder of Jacob Wetterling in Minnesota; the abduction, sexual assault, and murder of Polly Klass in 
California . . . [and] of Megan Kanka in New Jersey.” Rachel Kate Bandy, The Impact of Sex Offender 
Policies on Victims, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 8, at 
471, 479. 
 24 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 79. 
 25 Id.; Patricia Wetterling & Richard G. Wright, The Politics of Sex Offender Policies: An Inter-
view with Patricia Wetterling, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra 
note 8, at 99, 99–100. 
 26 Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 79. Curiously, it is not even certain that Jacob was the 
victim of a sex crime. EWING, supra note 22, at 75. 
 27 See 137 CONG. REC. S14945-01 (Oct. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Gorton); Wetterling & 
Wright, supra note 25, at 100–01. The Jacob Wetterling Foundation was subsequently renamed the 
Jacob Wetterling Resource Center, and in 2010 it merged with the National Child Protection Training 
Center. See History, GUNDERSON NAT’L CHILD PROT. TRAINING CTR., http://www.gundersenhealth.
org/ncptc/jacob-wetterling-resource-center/who-we-are/history [http://perma.cc/WDJ8-CVMS]. 
 28 See EMILY HOROWITZ, PROTECTING OUR KIDS? HOW SEX OFFENDER LAWS ARE FAILING US 
58 (2015). Lawmakers reiterated this argument when the legislation was being evaluated, with one 
lawmaker stating, “[I]f local and State police had been aware of the presence of any convicted sex 
offenders in the community, that information would have been invaluable during those first critical 
hours of investigation. The Jacob Wetterling bill will provide law enforcement with this tool.” 139 
CONG. REC. S6840-02 (May 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger). 
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children, thus catalyzing legislative action.29 Likewise, it provided an oppor-
tunity for the nation’s lawmakers to stand behind a cause that appeals to all 
constituents: the safety of America’s children.30 Comments made by these 
lawmakers in the course of discussions and debates regarding the bill are tell-
ing, with one Senator noting: “There is evidence that the behavior of child sex 
offenders is repetitive to the point of compulsion. In fact, one state prison psy-
chologist has observed that sex offenders against children have the same per-
sonality characteristics as serial killers.”31 Another Senator advocating for the 
passage of the legislation stated: “The reason this bill is so important is be-
cause of the high rate of recidivism in persons who have committed crimes 
against children . . . . The recidivism rate is probably higher in this area of our 
criminal justice system or in violations of the criminal code.”32 
When the Wetterling Act was eventually passed in 1994, one lawmaker 
noted that Jacob’s mother Patricia “deserves most of the credit for passing this 
bill” and lauded her for turning “a family tragedy into a legislative crusade.”33 
The Wetterling Act required each state to create a registry to provide local po-
lice departments with personal information about released sex offenders, in-
cluding their home and work addresses.34 Ultimately, the Wetterling Act was 
only the beginning of a long succession of legislation aimed at restricting the 
freedoms of sexual offenders in the name of protecting children from the pos-
sibility of sexual abuse.35 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See 139 CONG. REC. S6840-02 (May 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger); Terry & 
Ackerman, supra note 16, at 74, 79. 
 30 See Wetterling & Wright, supra note 25, at 107. 
 31 See 139 CONG. REC. S6840-02 (May 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger). 
 32 See 139 CONG. REC. H10319-02 (Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
 33 See 139 CONG. REC. H10319-02 (Nov. 30, 1993) (statement of Sen. Ramstad). Interestingly, 
Patricia Wetterling’s stance on sex offender legislation has greatly evolved over the years. See HU-
MAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 34 (2007), http://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf [http://perma.cc/U2XR-GMXU]. In an inter-
view with Human Rights Watch she noted, “I based my support of broad-based community notifica-
tion laws on my assumption that sex offenders have the highest recidivism rates of any criminal. But 
the high recidivism rates I assumed to be true do not exist.” Id. Moreover, Patricia Wetterling has 
addressed her objections to residency restrictions directly: “Residency restrictions are also wrong and 
ludicrous and make no sense at all. We’re putting all of our energy on the stranger, the bad guy, and 
the reality is . . . most sex offenses are committed by somebody that gains your trust, or is a friend or 
relative, and so none of these laws address the real, sacred thing that nobody wants to talk about.” 
Wetterling & Wright, supra note 25, at 103. 
 34 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (Supp. II 2008, Supp. V 2011), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2012); see Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 79; 
Wetterling & Wright, supra note 25, at 100. The Wetterling Act conditioned federal funding to states 
for crime prevention and control programs on the implementation of registration and notification pro-
visions. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 36. States that did not comply with federal regis-
tration and community notification laws would lose ten percent of their federal funding from the Ed-
ward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant Program. Id. at 36 n.93. 
 35 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 65–66. 
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A. The Impact & Underlying Assumptions of the Wetterling Act 
Once the Wetterling Act was enacted in 1994, state legislatures across the 
country began using the new database of information created pursuant to the 
Act to implement residency restrictions, typically by prohibiting registered sex 
offenders from residing within 500 to 2500 feet of locations where children 
congregate.36 In 1995, Florida was the first state to enact such regulations, re-
quiring a 1000-foot residency “buffer zone” around specific locales to exclude 
sex offenders who were released on probation for abusing minors.37 Although 
these statewide residency restrictions had been in effect since 1995, the City of 
Miami Beach became the first municipality to enact a local ordinance in 
2005.38 The local ordinance extended beyond the state level restriction of 1000 
feet by imposing a 2500-foot “buffer zone.”39 Other municipalities rapidly fol-
lowed suit, with 133 local ordinances enacted in Florida alone between 2005 
and 2008.40 Similar local ordinances have even been implemented in states that 
do not have a statewide statute.41 
Tragic cases such as that of Jacob Wetterling, which received intense me-
dia coverage, portrayed perpetrators of child sex abuse as strangers to their 
victims and repeat offenders that “lurk[] in schoolyards.”42 Thus, the policies 
at the heart of the Wetterling Act and subsequent legislation were largely moti-
vated by two popular, yet questionable, assumptions: that sex offenders have 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 267. These restricted locations typically include schools, parks, 
playgrounds, and day care centers. Id. at 268. 
 37 Id. at 268. Florida’s current statute provides that a person convicted of an offense enumerated 
within the legislation that occurred while the victim was under sixteen years of age, “may not reside 
within 1,000 feet of any school, child care facility, park, or playground.” FLA. STAT. § 775.215(2)(a) 
(2010 & Supp. 2012). The restriction does not apply if a prohibited locale subsequently opens within 
1000 feet of an offender’s residence after their residency has already been established. Id. 
 38 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 268, 270. 
 39 CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE art. VI, §§ 70-400 to -402 (2005). Also in 2005, in re-
sponse to the kidnapping, rape, and murder of nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford at the hands of a repeat 
sex offender, a crime which was heavily reported in the national media, the Florida legislature passed 
the Jessica Lunsford Act (“Jessica’s Law”). Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 89; Levenson, supra 
note 8, at 268–69. Jessica’s Law increased the penalties for “sexually based offenses against minors,” 
including a mandatory minimum twenty-five year sentence for first-time child sex offenders and elec-
tronic tracking for life. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 78, 89. As of 2011, forty-four states 
have enacted a version of Jessica’s Law. Ben Jones, Growing Number of Laws Propelled by Crime 
Victims, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2011, 12:27 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/
2011-09-23/child-laws/50518548/1 [http://perma.cc/GVE9-Y2P4]. 
 40 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 271. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Matt R. Nobels et al., Effectiveness of Residence Restrictions in Preventing Sex Offense Recidi-
vism, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 491, 494–95 (2012); see Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 93. Cases 
like that of Jacob Wetterling, which receive an immense amount of media attention, tend to be “outli-
ers.” See Dwight Merriam, Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders: A Failure of Public Policy, 60 
PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4 (2008). Statistics vary, but “most victims are family, friends, or acquaintances of 
the sex offender.” Id. 
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higher recidivism rates than other types of criminals and the concept of 
“stranger-danger.”43 Discussed more in depth in Part II, these assumptions are 
not supported by empirical data, yet still continue to be championed by propo-
nents of residency restriction legislation.44 Residency restrictions seek to serve 
the goal of public safety by allowing law enforcement agencies to better moni-
tor and track registered sex offenders and by reducing the opportunities for 
offenders to recidivate by minimizing their interaction with children.45 Thus, it 
is unsurprising that these policies easily resonate with the public and politi-
cians alike.46 
B. Federal Legislative Developments Since the Wetterling Act 
Following the lead of the Wetterling Act, state and federal legislation have 
continued to attempt to address the management and supervision of sex of-
fenders.47 For example, in 1996, a provision entitled Megan’s Law was added 
as a subsection to the Wetterling Act; the provision mandates specific notifica-
tion procedures and public access to information regarding registered offend-
ers, rather than simply leaving the dissemination of such information to the 
discretion of law enforcement officials.48 Because the legislation did not pro-
vide detailed instructions regarding notification, states varied in their ap-
proaches to implementing Megan’s Law.49 As was the case with the Wetterling 
Act, Megan’s Law received overwhelming support from lawmakers because it 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Francis Williams, The Problem of Sexual Assault, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLI-
CIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 8, at 39 (noting that the available research indicates that the com-
monly accepted notion that sex offenders have high recidivism rates as compared to other criminals is 
a false premise); Michelle L. Meloy et al., Making Sense Out of Nonsense: The Deconstruction of 
State-Level Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 209, 210 (2008). 
 44 See infra notes 120–133 and accompanying text. 
 45 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 271; Lisa L. Sample & Mary K. Evans, Sex Offender Registra-
tion and Community Notifications, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, 
supra note 8, at 211, 221 (stating that the goals of sex offender legislation include “decreas[ing] vic-
timization rates and increas[ing] public safety through improved monitoring and tracking mechanisms 
for sex offenders”); Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 88. 
 46 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 267, 272. 
 47 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 75–78. 
 48 See id. at 80; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 2. Megan’s Law was enacted in re-
sponse to the 1994 rape and murder of seven-year-old New Jersey resident Megan Kanka by a neigh-
bor who was “a recidivist pedophile.” Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 79; see HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 33, at 48. The case was extensively covered in the media, highlighting Kanka’s 
parents’ argument that the registration requirements of the Wetterling Act were not sufficient. See 
KAREN TERRY, SEXUAL OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 217 (2nd ed. 
2012); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 48. They petitioned for legislation that would re-
quire notification to community members if a repeat child sex offender were living in close proximity 
to their houses. See TERRY, supra, at 217. By August 1996, all fifty states had enacted a version of 
Megan’s Law. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 80; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, 
at 48. 
 49 Sample & Evans, supra note 45, at 214; see TERRY, supra note 48, at 220. 
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requires sex offenders to provide a plethora of personal information to law en-
forcement officials, including “photograph[s] . . . addresses . . . telephone 
numbers, social security numbers, employment information and finger-
prints.”50 The registration requirements of the Wetterling Act, combined with 
the notification requirements of Megan’s Law, have been described as the 
“one-two punch” necessary to address sex offender recidivism.51 
The Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act 
(“Lychner Act”) was passed in 1996 as an additional subsection to the Wetter-
ling Act.52 The Lychner Act called for the creation of a national database at the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) “to track the whereabouts” of sexually 
violent predators and those convicted of sexually violent crimes or offenses 
against children.53 The Lychner Act further required certain types of offenders 
to verify address changes directly with the FBI and permitted the FBI to com-
municate such registration information to other law enforcement agencies.54 
The Lychner Act was intended to create a centralized national database that 
would eliminate the lack of consistency between states in regards to registra-
tion and notification procedures.55 
Later, in 2006, the Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law were both supplanted 
by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act”), 
which has been described as “one of the most comprehensive acts ever created 
to supervise and manage sex offenders.”56 The Adam Walsh Act set national 
standards regarding certain contemporary, hot button legal issues, including 
the registration and notification of sex offenders, civil commitment, child por-
nography prevention, and internet safety.57 The Adam Walsh Act also created a 
national sex offender registry, which combined all of the already-existing state 
registries to create national registration and notification standards for all of-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Sample & Evans, supra note 45, at 215; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 48. 
 51 Elizabeth Rahmberg Walsh & Fred Cohen, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION & COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION: A “MEGAN’S LAW” SOURCEBOOK 1–2 (2000). 
 52 Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–
14073, repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 
(2012); see Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 77. 
 53 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 58; see also Background on the National Sex Offend-
ers Registry, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/registry/background_nsor [https://perma.cc/
4JWF-VHW8]. The Lychner Act was named after Pam Lychner, an adult victim of a violent sexual 
attack at the hands of a recidivist sex offender. See TERRY, supra note 48, at 218; Terry & Ackerman, 
supra note 16, at 86. 
 54 See LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, IN BRIEF 4 (Mar. 25, 
2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43954.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JMA-KPA3]. 
 55 See TERRY, supra note 48, at 218; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 81. 
 56 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 78, 90. The Adam Walsh 
Act is named after Adam Walsh, who was abducted and killed in Florida in 1981. See TERRY, supra 
note 48, at 219. 
 57 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 91. 
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fenders.58 The enactment of these national standards provides consistent poli-
cies and guidelines for sex offender management across all states, which was 
lacking in previous legislation.59 The Adam Walsh Act is also much more ex-
pansive than predecessor legislation.60 Its provisions “expanded . . . to include 
additional offenses and offenders, enhanced supervision, and extended the time 
in which offenders would be subject to these requirements.”61 
Further, the development of the Adam Walsh Act, similar to its predeces-
sors, was heavily influenced by the concept of “stranger-danger” and the notion 
that sex offenders are high-risk recidivists.62 The legislation calls for community 
notification of all offenders, rather than just high and moderate-risk offenders.63 
This expansion faced criticism because it was not properly tailored to require 
notification only of those offenders most at risk to recidivate.64 The Adam Walsh 
Act also makes failure to comply with registration requirements a felony, pun-
ishable by up to ten years in prison.65 The legislation has been described as 
“sweeping” and troubling because of its “one-size-fits-all” approach.66 
C. The Legal Landscape Surrounding Doe v. Miami-Dade County 
Since Miami Beach’s implementation of its 2500-foot “buffer zone” in 
2005, released sex offenders have struggled to find legal and affordable hous-
ing in Miami-Dade County.67 The local ordinance ultimately culminated in the 
development of an encampment of homeless sex offenders who took up resi-
dence under a bridge on the Julia Tuttle Causeway (the “Causeway”).68 The 
encampment began receiving significant attention shortly after enactment of 
the 2005 ordinance as more than seventy people took up residence there at the 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Sample & Evans, supra note 45, at 216; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 38. 
 59 See TERRY, supra note 48, at 220. 
 60 Id. at 230. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 65, 90–91; Sample & Evans, supra note 45, at 217. 
 63 TERRY, supra note 48, at 231. 
 64 Id. (“This is problematic because the community will no longer be able to discern which of the 
offenders are the most dangerous and most likely to recidivate, which was the original purpose of the 
notification legislation.”). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 1. 
 68 See Catharine Skipp, A Law for the Sex Offenders Under a Miami Bridge, TIME MAG. (Feb. 1, 
2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1957778,00.html [http://perma.cc/KZL7-
4KAF]; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Challenges Miami-Dade County’s 2,500-Foot Sex Offender 
Residency Restriction (Oct. 9, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_drug-law-
reform_immigrants-rights/aclu-challenges-miami-dade-countys [https://perma.cc/LBA7-77P4]. The 
Causeway connects Miami Beach with mainland Miami. John Zarrella & Patrick Oppmann, Florida 
Housing Sex Offenders Under Bridge, CNN (Apr. 6, 2007, 1:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2007/
LAW/04/05/bridge.sex.offenders [http://perma.cc/4HUR-JMRG]. 
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direction of their probation officers.69 This was the only housing option these 
residents could find that was in compliance with the local residency re-
strictions.70 The Causeway encampment was eventually disbanded by 2010, 
resulting in the development of various similar homeless camps throughout the 
county that have persisted.71 
Due to the critical lack of housing options that the 2005 ordinance left 
available to released offenders, Miami-Dade County passed The Lauren Book 
Child Safety Ordinance (“the Book Ordinance”) in January 2010.72 The Book 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Skipp, supra note 68; Zarrella & Oppmann, supra note 68. The number of individuals 
reported to have lived under the Julia Tuttle Causeway during this time varies. See Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that over one hundred people lived at the encampment by 2010); 
David Reutter, Band-Aid Applied to Florida’s Homeless Sex Offender Colony Falls Off, PRISON LE-
GAL NEWS (Mar. 2011), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2011/mar/15/band-aid-applied-to-
floridas-homeless-sex-offender-colony-falls-off [https://perma.cc/9SKB-PCL9] (“In July 2009, as 
many as 140 people were living under the Julia Tuttle bridge.”); Skipp, supra note 68 (stating that the 
encampment had “as many as 70 residents”). 
 70 See Zarrella & Oppmann, supra note 68. 
 71 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 9, 11–12, 14. After receiving a significant amount of 
negative publicity, authorities responded by installing “No Trespassing” signs and by ultimately tear-
ing down the encampments. Reutter, supra note 69. Following the dissolution of the Causeway en-
campment, many of the “residents” relocated and formed alternative encampments that also received 
extensive media coverage. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 11, 12. “Residents” of the so-
called “Shorecrest encampment,” developed on a sidewalk in the Miami neighborhood of its name-
sake, were forced to relocate in 2012 when Miami’s City Commissioner strategically established a 
small public park in the area, preventing convicted sex offenders from taking up residency within 
2500 feet of the locale. See id.; Christiana Lilly, Marc Sarnoff Creates Little River Pocket Park to 
Keep Sex Offenders From Shorecrest, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2010, 11:29 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/marc-sarnoff-creates-pocket-park-sex-offenders_n_1428637.html 
[http://perma.cc/2ZAP-6YEQ]. In 2013, up to fifty-four individuals who had taken up residency in a 
mobile home park known as “River Park” in the neighborhood of Allapattah, Florida, were also forced 
to relocate after a nearby emergency youth shelter was deemed to be a “school” under the 2010 Lau-
ren Book Child Safety Ordinance; thus the area became off limits to those subject to the ordinance’s 
residency restrictions. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 12, 14. The encampment at issue in 
Doe was established in 2013 on railroad tracks in the area of NW 36th Court and NW 71st Street in 
the Miami-Dade County city of Hialeah, Florida. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 1; Rabin, 
supra note 3. There are approximately fifty “residents” at this encampment, which has been described 
as “the only possible location for scores of individuals.” Press Release, ACLU, supra note 4. 
 72 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 9 & n.2; Julie Brown, Miami-Dade Votes to Widen 
Housing Options for Sex Offenders, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 21, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/
2010-01-21/news/fl-miami-tuttle-vote-20100121_1_sexual-offenders-housing-options-child-safety-
zones [http://perma.cc/BR9C-UQ8S]; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. After the Book 
Ordinance was passed in January 2010, it was subsequently renamed the Lauren Book Safety Ordi-
nance in October 2010. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 9 n.2. Lauren Book, the daughter of 
prominent Florida lobbyist Ron Book, was the victim of daily physical and sexual abuse at the hands 
of her long-time, live-in nanny, beginning when she was eleven years old. See Sexual Abuse: What 
Finally Made It ‘Ok to Tell’, NPR (Apr. 9, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/09/
150286297/sexual-abuse-what-finally-made-it-ok-to-tell [http://perma.cc/ASD4-ZWWC]; Skipp, 
supra note 8. Lauren’s nanny, Waldina Flores, was later sentenced to ten years in prison after being 
convicted of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation of a minor. See Sexual Abuse: What 
Finally Made It ‘Ok to Tell’, supra; Skipp, supra note 8. Her sentence was extended to twenty-five 
years when it was discovered that Flores was still in contact with Lauren. See Sexual Abuse: What 
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Ordinance repealed sex offender laws in at least twenty-four municipalities 
within the county and sought to address the problems created by the strict 2005 
ordinance.73 The updated, more relaxed ordinance prohibited sex offenders 
convicted of certain crimes against victims under the age of sixteen from resid-
ing within 2500 feet of any school.74 By limiting prohibited locations under the 
Book Ordinance to simply schools, rather than a host of areas frequented by 
children, the state sought to create more housing options for offenders, thus 
reducing homelessness and the development of encampments, such as the one 
that had developed under the Causeway.75 Nonetheless, many of the issues that 
resulted from the earlier ordinances persisted.76 
                                                                                                                           
Finally Made It ‘Ok to Tell’, supra. Feeling guilt and confusion after the ordeal, Lauren wrote to Flo-
res in prison and the two began what Lauren described as a “writing campaign back and forth.” Id. In 
contrast, the letters from Flores to Lauren have been described elsewhere in the media as “love letters 
from prison.” See Jeffrey Pierre, Lauren Book to Be Honored for Her Work in Speaking Out Against 
Childhood Sexual Abuse, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 21, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/local/community/miami-dade/downtown-miami/article3205437.html [http://perma.cc/39BA-
6A3V]. Lauren’s experience led her to establish a non-profit organization to help “prevent childhood 
sexual abuse and help other survivors heal.” About Lauren’s Kids, LAUREN’S KIDS, http://laurenskids.
org/about [http://perma.cc/QJ8L-468T]. Lauren and her father have since been strong supporters of 
stricter Florida sex offender laws—in particular residency restrictions. See Skipp, supra note 68; Leg-
islation, LAUREN’S KIDS, http://laurenskids.org/advocacy/legislation [http://perma.cc/V9RF-QEML]. 
Notably, Ron Book has since conceded that the Book Ordinance has led to various unintended conse-
quences—namely the development of homeless encampments—and has stated his commitment to “be 
part of the solution.” Skipp, supra note 8. Yet, following the filing of the ACLU’s complaint in the 
matter of Doe v. Miami-Dade, Ron reaffirmed his support for residency restrictions by stating, “I 
don’t support those with sexual deviant behavior living in close proximity to where kids are.” See 
Rabin, supra note 3. 
 73 See Brown, supra note 72. 
 74 The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANC-
ES ch. 21, art. XVII, §§ 21-277 to -285 (2010); see supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 75 See Skipp, supra note 68; Brown, supra note 72. 
 76 See Allen, supra note 9. As explained in the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in Doe: 
There is no centralized, accurate, or reliable process under the Ordinance for regularly 
classifying new schools, accounting for previously omitted schools, or declassifying 
and removing facilities that are no longer schools. While the Miami-Dade Police De-
partment provides online mapping assistance for the residency restrictions, it expressly 
“does not assume responsibility for the accuracy or timeliness of the information dis-
played” . . . . There is no exemption for an individual whose noncompliance results 
from inaccurate or outdated information from government officials as to what consti-
tutes a school . . . [and] there is no language in the Ordinance narrowing the scope of 
the term “school” to clarify whether the definition may apply to facilities not expressly 
labeled as or commonly considered schools, but which may provide educational pro-
gramming for youth, such as emergency youth shelters, hospitals, juvenile detention 
centers, prisons and home-school arrangements. 
Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 11, 21. The Amended Complaint continues to explain that, at a 
July 2013 meeting between the Miami-Dade Police Department, staff from the Miami-Dade County 
Public Schools, and the Miami-Dade County Attorney’s office, the meaning of “school” under the 
Ordinance was updated to include “any location where children receive instruction.” Id. at 13. As a 
result of this change, at least one locale was reclassified as a “school” under the Ordinance. See id. at 
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In the context of this legal landscape, the plaintiffs in Doe v. Miami-Dade 
County brought various claims against Miami-Dade County, the Florida De-
partment of Corrections, and Sunny Ukenye, the Circuit Administrator for the 
Miami Circuit Office of the Florida Department of Corrections.77 The Amend-
ed Complaint alleged that the Book Ordinance should be void for vagueness 
because it fails to definitively define what constitutes a “school,” and that en-
forcement of the Book Ordinance is a substantive due process violation of the 
plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to personal security and to acquire residential 
property under the Fourteenth Amendment.78 The Amended Complaint also 
alleged that the Book Ordinance is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, as the 
plaintiffs claim that the residency restrictions are “clearly punitive” and were 
passed “with the intent to punish” convicted sex offenders.79 At the core of 
these claims is the contention that the defendants’ “arbitrary and discriminato-
ry enforcement” of the Book Ordinance diminished the housing options avail-
able to the plaintiffs to the point of forcing them into homelessness.80 The 
Amended Complaint specifically made note of the “false assumptions” and 
lack of factual basis to support the means by which the Book Ordinance pur-
ports to serve the goal of public safety.81 
Unsurprisingly, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of the plain-
tiffs’ claims and the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
                                                                                                                           
14. Almost one hundred offenders were then notified that their residences were no longer in compli-
ance with the Ordinance, and they would have five days to relocate. See id. These notifications were 
later abruptly rescinded. See id. at 15. The plaintiffs argue that this exemplifies the arbitrary nature of 
enforcement and the confusion created by the terms of the Ordinance. See id. at 1. 
 77 Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 8. 
 78 Id. at 21, 22, 24. 
 79 Id. at 25. An ex post facto law is a law “that impermissibly applies retroactively . . . in a way 
that negatively affects a person’s rights . . . [by] increasing the punishment for past conduct. Ex post 
facto criminal laws are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.” Ex post facto law, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The plaintiffs argued that the Book Ordinance, and the negative effects that 
flow from its application, serve as additional punishment for their offenses, especially given that it 
applies to offenders that are not required to register under Florida law. Amended Complaint, supra 
note 2, at 25. 
 80 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 16. 
 81 Id. at 17–19. The Amended Complaint specifically makes note that “sexual offender recidivism 
rates are among the lowest for any category of offenses, and that this lower risk of sexual offense 
recidivism steadily declines over time.” Id. at 18. Further, the Amended Complaint explains: 
Research has also consistently shown that individual risk assessments are the most reli-
able method for determining the risk of recidivism for former offenders, rather than cat-
egorical assumptions about groups of former sexual offenders . . . residence restrictions 
of any stripe do not advance public safety. The vast majority of sexual crimes are com-
mitted by offenders familiar with the victim . . . . How close an individual lives to a 
school is irrelevant. The only demonstrated means of effectively managing reentry and 
recidivism are targeted treatment, along with maintaining supportive, stable environ-
ments that provide access to housing, employment, and transportation. 
Id. at 18–19. 
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Florida subsequently granted the defendants’ motion on April 3, 2015.82 Con-
sistent with courts that have had the opportunity to consider challenges to resi-
dency restrictions for sex offenders, the court was unwilling to seriously enter-
tain the plaintiffs’ claims.83 It quickly dismissed the plaintiffs’ ex post facto 
claim, finding that the Book Ordinance advances the legitimate governmental 
interest of “protecting children from the threat of repeat offenses posed by sex 
offenders . . . by reducing opportunities for contact between sex offenders and 
children.”84 
Likewise, the court determined that the terms of the Book Ordinance are 
not void for vagueness.85 “[T]he plain language of the statute itself,” the court 
reasoned, “provide[d] fair notice” of what constitutes a school and thus, what 
locales are included under the terms of the Book Ordinance.86 Finally, the 
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims.87 It mentioned 
that other courts “have found that reasonable restrictions on convicted sex of-
fenders serve the legitimate public interest in protecting children from the 
‘frighteningly high’ risk of recidivism posed by such individuals” and that such 
restrictions do not necessarily have to be the “best and most effective public 
policy available.”88 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Fla. Dep’t of Corr. and Sunny Ukenye Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 
14-CV-23933 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2014); Miami-Dade County Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. Miami-Dade 
Cnty., No. 14-CV-23933 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2014). The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs failed 
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 
4, Doe v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 14-CV-23933 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2015). 
 83 See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 82, at 14, 16, 19; see also infra notes 91–
104 and accompanying text. 
 84 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 82, at 7, 14. In its analysis, the court also noted 
that the Book Ordinance was not overly broad and excessive because it is “tailored to cover only those 
offenders who pose the greatest danger to children,” because it applied to offenders convicted of only 
certain enumerated offenses. Id.at 8–9. The court determined that this sufficiently narrowed the scope 
of the residency restrictions, even though the terms of the Book Ordinance apply indefinitely and fail 
“to account for rehabilitation and treatment.” Id. at 8. 
 85 Id. at 16. 
 86 Id. The language of the Book Ordinance specifies that sex offenders convicted of certain of-
fenses may not “reside within 2,500 feet of any school.” The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, 
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 21, art. XVII, § 21-281 (2010). “School” is 
defined as “a public or private kindergarten, elementary, middle or secondary (high) school.” Id. § 21-
280(9). 
 87 See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 82, at 17, 19. 
 88 Id. at 18 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102–03 (2003)). With this determination, the court 
seemingly ignored the data cited by the plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint that pointed to the “false 
assumptions” about sex offender recidivism rates and the lack of evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
residency restrictions. See id. at 18–19; Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 17–19. 
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D. Legal Challenges to Residency Restrictions 
The plaintiffs in Doe v. Miami-Dade County are far from the first to chal-
lenge the legality of residency restrictions.89 However, outcomes to these chal-
lenges have varied.90 
1. Doe v. Miller: Challenging Iowa’s Residency Restrictions 
Perhaps the most well-known legal challenge stems from Iowa’s notori-
ous residency restriction law, first passed in 2002.91 The legislation prohibited 
convicted sex offenders with juvenile victims from residing within 2000 feet of 
a school or day care facility.92 Seeking a permanent injunction to prevent en-
forcement of the law, a group of sex offenders brought a class action suit 
against the state in Doe v. Miller.93 The suit alleged a host of constitutional 
infringements.94 In 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Iowa agreed with the plaintiffs’ claims and issued a permanent injunction pre-
venting enforcement of the residency restrictions.95 However, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later reversed the district court decision and up-
held the law as constitutional.96 Upon being reinstated, the law “was retroac-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See infra notes 91–115 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 91–115 and accompanying text. 
 91 Levenson, supra note 8, at 269. 
 92 IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2002) (current version at 692A.114 (2016)); Levenson, supra note 8, 
at 269; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 104. 
 93 Doe v. Miller (Miller II), 298 F.Supp.2d 844, 847 (S.D. Iowa 2004). One of the plaintiffs in the 
case, “John Doe 1,” was forced to register as a sex offender in Iowa after moving from Wisconsin to 
Iowa City, Iowa in Johnson County to attend college. Id. at 852; see Doe v. Miller (Miller I), 216 
F.R.D. 462, 468 (S.D. Iowa 2003). In Wisconsin, he was convicted of second-degree sexual assault 
after engaging in consensual sex with a fourteen-year-old girl when he was eighteen years old. Miller 
II, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 852. The act, if committed in Iowa, would not have constituted a crime. Id. The 
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa noted at an earlier phase in the case that “[a] map of 
Johnson County shows that there is virtually no place in Iowa City for a sex offender to live.” Miller I, 
216 F.R.D. at 468. 
 94 See Miller II, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 847. The plaintiffs alleged that the law violated their “substan-
tive due process rights of family privacy and freedom to travel, the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination, the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, and the 
right to procedural due process.” Id. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the law was “an unconstitu-
tional ex post facto law” as it would retroactively apply to sex offenders who committed their crimes 
prior to its enactment. Id. 
 95 Id. at 871, 880. The district court held that the law did represent “retroactive punishment 
forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause” and violated the plaintiffs’ substantive and procedural due 
process rights. Id. at 871. The district court further held that the law did not violate “the Eighth 
Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments.” Id. at 880. 
 96 Doe v. Miller (Miller III), 405 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2005). Notably, the plaintiffs specifically 
argued before the Eighth Circuit that “there is no scientific study that supports the legislature’s con-
clusion that excluding sex offenders from residing within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility is 
likely to enhance the safety of children.” Id. at 714. Although the court acknowledged that “precise 
statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily unpredictable,” it maintained that the 
334 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:319 
tively applied to its original implementation date in 2002, and thousands of sex 
offenders were forced to relocate.”97 
2. Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections: Challenging Georgia’s 
Residency Restrictions 
Similarly, Georgia’s residency restrictions have faced numerous challeng-
es in court.98 First implemented in 2003, Georgia’s initial residency restriction 
legislation prohibited registered sex offenders from living within 1000 feet of 
any school, childcare facility, or other areas where minors congregate, such as 
parks, recreation facilities, gymnasiums, skating rinks, and playgrounds.99 
These regulations were made even more restrictive in 2006 when the Georgia 
General Assembly passed additional legislation that added churches, swim-
ming pools, and school bus stops to prohibited locales and also banned regis-
tered sex offenders from working within 1000 feet of a childcare facility, 
school, or church.100 
These restrictions were challenged in Mann v. Georgia Department of 
Corrections, in which registered sex offender Anthony Mann argued that the 
law was an unconstitutional taking of his property.101 After a childcare facility 
                                                                                                                           
legislature had the discretion to make a policy determination regarding the implementation of residen-
cy restrictions. Id. at 714–16. 
 97 Levenson, supra note 8, at 269. The “crisis” that resulted from this retroactive application of 
the law prompted the Iowa County Attorneys Association to issue a 2006 report noting the failures of 
the legislation and calling for reform. Id.; see IOWA CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, STATEMENT ON SEX 
OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS IN IOWA 1, 5 (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.csom.org/pubs/
Iowa%20DAs%20Association_Sex%20Offender%20Residency%20Statement%20Dec%2011%2006.
pdf [https://perma.cc/RAH2-V9W9]. 
 98 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 269; Memorandum from Sarah Geraghty et al., The Law Office 
of the S. Ctr. for Human Rights, Overview of Whitaker v. Perdue 2, 4–5 (Apr. 12, 2010), https://www.
schr.org/files/post/Overview%20of%20Litigation%207.23.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CPF-U7L3]. 
 99 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-01-13 (2003) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 42-01-15 (2012)); see 
Geraghty et al., supra note 98, at 1. 
 100 H.B.1059, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 42-01-15 (2014)). 
It has been suggested that the more restrictive measures passed by the Georgia Legislature in 2006 
may have been motivated in part by the 2005 abduction, rape, and murder of Jessica Lunsford in 
neighboring Florida. See Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders 
from the State of Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.–C.L.L. REV. 513, 515 (2007). 
In addition, as 2006 was an election year, one scholar suggested that the legislative changes were used 
to gain political support. See id. 
 101 Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr. (Mann II), 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2007). Mann previously brought 
suit against the state in Mann v. State (Mann I), 603 S.E.2d 283 (2004). At the time of his first suit, 
Mann was living in his parents’ home. Id. at 285. The court, therefore, rejected his challenge to the 
residency restriction because Mann had only a “minimal” property interest in his living arrangement. 
See id. In 2003, Mann purchased a home with his wife. See Mann II, 653 S.E.2d at 742. When the 
home was purchased, it was not within 1000 feet of any restricted location under the law. See id. In 
2004, Mann purchased a barbecue restaurant that was, likewise, not within 1000 feet of any restricted 
locale. See id. Childcare facilities later opened within 1000 feet of both Mann’s home and business, 
which prompted him to again file suit. See id. 
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opened within 1000 feet of both Mann’s home and restaurant business, Mann’s 
probation officer “demanded” that he quit his business and move from his 
home in order to avoid arrest and revocation of his probation.102 On appeal, the 
Georgia Supreme Court held that, with respect to Mann’s home, the law consti-
tuted a taking of Mann’s property without compensation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.103 However, the court also held that Mann “failed to estab-
lish that the economic impact of the work restriction . . . effected an unconsti-
tutional taking” with regards to his business.104 
3. In re Taylor: Challenging Residency Restrictions in California 
In California, voters overwhelmingly supported Proposition 83 in No-
vember 2006, which prohibited all registered sex offenders from living within 
2000 feet of any school, daycare facility, park, or other place where children 
gather.105 The law garnered significant support, despite an August 2006 report 
from the California Research Bureau highlighting the unintended consequenc-
es of residency restrictions and warning that such legislation might actually 
decrease public safety by “driv[ing] . . . offenders in the country under-
ground.”106 California’s victim advocacy group also opposed the law.107 Its 
position stated that the legislation was “a shortsighted approach to sex offender 
management that will place California communities in greater danger” and that 
it would “waste valuable resources on sex offenders who are unlikely to 
reoffend.”108 
The law was quickly challenged in California courts.109 In San Diego 
County, a group of sex offenders challenged the constitutionality of the resi-
dency restrictions, arguing that the restrictions violated “various state and fed-
eral constitutional rights, including their privacy rights, property rights, rights 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Mann II, 653 S.E.2d at 742. 
 103 See id. at 745–46. In a unanimous opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court notably stated that, 
“[u]nder the terms of [the 2006 statute], it is apparent that there is no place in Georgia where a regis-
tered sex offender can live without being continually at risk of being ejected.” Id. at 742. 
 104 Id. at 746. 
 105 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (West 2014) (originally passed by ballot proposition as “Proposi-
tion 83: Sex Offenders. Sexually Violent Predators. Punishment, Residence Restrictions and Monitor-
ing. Initiative Statute”); see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 112. Proposition 83 passed 
with support from seventy percent of voters. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 112. The 
law was named “Jessica’s Law” in honor of Jessica Lunsford and was modeled after the Florida legis-
lation of the same name. See Levenson, supra note 8, at 269; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 78. 
 106 See MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, THE IMPACT OF RESI-
DENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A LIT-
ERATURE REVIEW 1, 21, 24 (Aug. 2006), https://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/08/06-008.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ACW7-K26C]; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 113. 
 107 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 269. 
 108 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 113. 
 109 See Bruce Zucker, Jessica’s Law Residency Restrictions in California: The Current State of 
the Law, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV 101, 110 (2014). 
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to intrastate travel, and substantive due process rights.”110 After an evidentiary 
hearing, the San Diego Superior Court held that the residency restriction “was 
‘unconstitutionally “unreasonable”’ as applied . . . because it violated petition-
ers’ right to intrastate travel, their right to establish a home, and their right to 
privacy and was not narrowly drawn and specifically tailored to the individual 
circumstances of each sex offender parolee.”111 Throughout the proceedings, 
the court also found that the residency restriction prevented sex offender parol-
ees from living in “[ninety-seven percent] of the existing rental property that 
would otherwise be available to [them].”112 
The state appealed the trial court’s decision, which was affirmed by Cali-
fornia’s Fourth District Court of Appeals.113 The Supreme Court of California 
also affirmed the judgment and stated in its opinion that residency restrictions 
“bear[] no rational relationship to advancing the state’s legitimate goal of pro-
tecting children” and cited increased homelessness and decreased access to 
“rehabilitative social services” among the many problems created by residency 
restrictions.114 Although California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabili-
tation may still impose a residency restriction on individual offenders, if sup-
ported by the particular circumstances of the offender’s case, blanket re-
strictions imposed on all released offenders are now prohibited in the state.115 
II. THE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS & REAL IMPACT OF  
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 
Residency restrictions for sex offenders have been justified over the years 
as a tool to increase public safety.116 By prohibiting known sex offenders from 
living within close proximity to places where children commonly congregate, 
proponents claim that an offender’s opportunity and temptation to reoffend 
                                                                                                                           
 110 In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 67 (2012), review granted and opinion superseded, 290 
P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013), aff’d, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015). 
 111 See id. 
 112 Id. at 75. 
 113 Id. at 84. 
 114 In re Taylor, 343 P.3d at 869. In its opinion, the court discusses the “disturbing” results of 
blanket enforcement of residency restrictions: 
Detective Jim Ryan, a supervisor in the San Diego Police Department’s Sex Offender 
Registration Unit, testified to a dramatic increase in the number of sex offender parol-
ees who registered as transient with his department in the two years after the law took 
effect. The trial court specifically found that blanket enforcement of the residency re-
strictions in the County has “result[ed] in large groups of parolees having to sleep in al-
leys and riverbeds, a circumstance that did not exist prior to Jessica’s Law.” 
Id. at 881. 
 115 Id. at 882. 
 116 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 88; Levenson & Cotter, supra note 1, at 169. 
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will be reduced, in turn protecting children from such offenders.117As residen-
cy restrictions have been implemented and applied, however, there is an 
emerging recognition that the goal of public safety is not being accomplished 
through these means.118 This failure can be attributed to two myths heavily 
underlying sex offender policies: the myth of “stranger danger” and the myth 
that sex offender recidivism is inevitable.119 
A. False Assumptions & Myths 
Although the intentions motivating the passage of sex offender legislation 
and residency restrictions may be commendable, there is a lack of empirical 
data supporting the effectiveness of such legislation.120 Primarily, the core con-
tention that child sex abuse is perpetrated at the hands of strangers has repeat-
edly been disproven.121 Rather, “sexual violence against children . . . is over-
whelmingly perpetrated by family members or acquaintances.”122 According to 
a 2000 U.S. Department of Justice study, thirty-four percent of juvenile sexual 
abuse victims are molested by a family member and fifty-nine percent are mo-
lested by close acquaintances.123 Thus, in this study, only seven percent of 
child sexual assault perpetrators were strangers to their victims.124 The consid-
erable amount of research in this area has reliably dispelled the myth of 
“stranger-danger,” which has long served as a basis for sex offender legisla-
tion.125 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 88; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 4. 
 118 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 278; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 4. 
 119 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 275–76; Merriam, supra note 42, at 4. 
 120 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 283; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 93. 
 121 See Merriam, supra note 42, at 4. 
 122 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 24. 
 123 HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHIL-
DREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 
10 (July 2000), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SU7-NQUQ]. The 
study defined juveniles as eighteen years or younger at the time of the crime. Id. at 2. 
 124 Id. at 10. 
 125 See DANIEL M. SPRAGUE ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, ZONED OUT: STATES CONSID-
ER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR SEX OFFENDERS 1, 6 (2008), http://www.csg.org/knowledge
center/docs/pubsafety/ZonedOut.pdf [http://perma.cc/CEU4-9JVB] (noting a 1997 Bureau of Justice 
Statistics study that found “approximately 75 percent of all sexual assault victimizations are commit-
ted by an individual known to the victim” and, in ninety percent of rape cases with a victim under 
twelve years old, the offender was known to the victim); Merriam, supra note 42, at 4 (stating that 
“[a]bout 93 percent of victims of sex offenders know the perpetrator” and that the myth of “stranger-
danger” is the “most common misperception” about sex offenders); NIETO & JUNG, supra note 106, at 
24 (finding that, although most high-profile child sexual assault cases involve a stranger assailant, 
statistical research from the U.S. Department of Justice has consistently demonstrated that this is not 
the norm). It is important to note, however, that such statistics are limited by the fact that they do 
not—and cannot—take into account unreported incidents of sexual abuse on minors. See JOHN Q. 
LAFOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HOW SOCIETY SHOULD COPE WITH SEX OFFENDERS 16 
(2005). 
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Likewise, the perception of the effectiveness of residency restriction laws 
lacks a basis in empirical data.126 Residency restrictions are not only rooted in 
the concept of “stranger-danger,” but also in the widely accepted notion that 
sex offenders have a high probability of recidivism.127 Given these comple-
mentary perceptions, which lack empirical support, it is believed that potential 
victims of sexual abuse are best protected by preventing sex offenders from 
residing in areas that easily allow access to children, thereby reducing oppor-
tunities to recidivate.128 Although researchers in this area acknowledge that 
“official recidivism rates do underestimate true offense rates,” there is a broad 
range of research that concludes that recidivism of sex offenders is not nearly 
as high as the public has been made to believe.129 
For example, a U.S. Department of Justice study released in 2003 found 
that only 3.3 percent of released child molesters were rearrested within three 
years for another sex crime against a child.130 An additional study, described in 
2007 by Human Rights Watch as “the most comprehensive study of sex of-
fender recidivism to date,” found a slightly higher recidivism rate, concluding 
that within four to six years of release, “child molesters” had a recidivism rate 
of thirteen percent.131 Given the exaggerated assumptions regarding recidivism 
rates, residency restrictions not only fail to successfully accomplish the goals 
they purport to serve, but also have led to a plethora of unintended conse-
                                                                                                                           
 126 See Alissa R. Ackerman & Karen J. Terry, Leaders in Sex Offender Research and Policy, in 
SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 8, at 399, 411; JILL LEVEN-
SON, A REPORT TO THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 2–3 (2005). 
 127 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 4, 24–25; Levenson, supra note 8, at 274, 276. 
 128 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 277; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 88. 
 129 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 274–75; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 25–26; 
Ackerman & Terry, supra note 126, at 411. 
 130 PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFEND-
ERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, 1, 31 (Nov. 2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
rsorp94.pdf [http://perma.cc/NP5F-HYTV]. 
 131 ANDREW J.R. HARRIS & R. KARL HANSON, PUB. SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
CANADA, SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM: A SIMPLE QUESTION 7 (2004), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/
cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/sx-ffndr-rcdvsm/index-en.aspx [https://perma.cc/M4EU-R6CB]; see HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 33, at 26–27. Despite the difficulties in determining actual recidivism rates, and 
data that suggests recidivism rates of sex offenders are far lower than assumed, the media and legisla-
tors have consistently justified sex offender legislation on the basis of high recidivism rates. See Le-
venson, supra note 8, at 272. For example, in 2006, New Hampshire’s Attorney General Kelly Ayotte 
argued for stronger penalties for sex offenders and stated to lawmakers that “sex offenders are com-
mitting the same type of offense over and over.” Id. Likewise, a California Assemblyman in 1997 
stated to The New York Times that “[w]hat we’re up against is the kind of criminal who, just as soon 
as he gets out of jail, will immediately commit this crime again at least ninety percent of the time.” Id. 
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quences.132 Nonetheless, residency restrictions have persisted and many sup-
porters of these restrictions remain resolute in their positions.133 
B. The Human Impact: Offenders 
Critics of residency restriction legislation have long noted that the one-size-
fits-all approach in regards to sex offenders is problematic for a number of rea-
sons.134 Representing a disconnect between purported goals and actual policy, 
most states that have enacted a statewide residency restriction for sex offenders 
apply the restriction to all offenders, regardless of the age of their victim.135 
Although there is limited research on the concrete impact such legislation 
has on the individuals it is applied to, the available data tells a story of signifi-
cant burden.136 A 2005 survey of registered sex offenders in Fort Lauderdale 
and Tampa, Florida sought to gain a better understanding of how offenders 
perceive and are impacted by residency restriction legislation.137 The results 
indicated that twenty-five percent of respondents were unable to return to their 
homes following release from prison and fifty-seven percent reported that the 
restrictions made it difficult to find affordable housing.138 Notably, the partici-
pants of this survey were only subject to the 1000-foot buffer zone imposed by 
Florida’s statewide residency restriction law.139 The study also solicited opin-
ions from sex offenders about the effectiveness of residency restrictions.140 
Among the responses were statements such as: (1) “The rule ‘serves no pur-
pose but to give some people the illusions of safety,’” (2) “If a person wants to 
offend, it doesn’t matter how close he is to a convenient place to find kids,” 
and (3) “I think that if someone wanted to offend, then they would do it at a 
place away from home.”141 In sum, the study concluded that offenders felt as 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 278–83 (providing an overview of the unintended consequenc-
es of residency restrictions, including severely limited housing options, financial instability, and ad-
verse psychological effects); see also infra notes 134–163 and accompanying text. 
 133 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 272; Levenson & Cotter, supra note 1, at 169. 
 134 See SPRAGUE ET AL., supra note 125, at 4; NIETO & JUNG, supra note 106, at 27. 
 135 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 101. Human Rights Watch reported in 2007 
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statewide residency restriction applies only to offenders convicted of certain offenses against victims 
under age sixteen. FLA. STAT. § 775.215(2)(a) (2010 & Supp. 2012). Local level residency restrictions 
vary. See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 106, at 21. For example, Miami-Dade County’s Book Ordinance 
applies only to sex offenders convicted of certain crimes against a victim less than sixteen years of 
age. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 136 See Jill S. Levenson & Andrea L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Unintended 
Consequences & Community Reentry, 9 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 59, 63 (2007). 
 137 See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 1, at 168, 170. 
 138 Id. at 173. 
 139 See id. at 171. 
 140 See id. at 170. 
 141 Id. at 174. 
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though “housing restrictions increased isolation, created financial and emo-
tional hardship, and led to decreased stability.”142 
These conclusions have been reiterated in other studies as well.143 A study 
published in 2008 evaluated sex offender recidivism among Minnesota offend-
ers and found that, when sex offender recidivists directly establish contact with 
their victims, “it was often more than a mile away from where they lived,” and 
that, “[o]f the few offenders who directly contacted a juvenile victim within 
close proximity to their residence, none did so near a school, park, playground, 
or other locations included in residential restriction laws.”144 
An additional 2006 study conducted in Orange County, Florida sought to 
demonstrate the expansive reach of residency restriction buffer zones.145 The 
study found that 95.2% of “potentially available properties” in the county were 
off limits under a 1000-foot residency restriction.146 Under a 2500-foot re-
striction—the same buffer zone limitation that the plaintiffs in Doe v. Miami-
Dade County are subject to—that percentage increased to 99.7%.147 This study 
provides an example of just how severely residency restrictions can decrease 
housing options for sex offenders, particularly in a metropolitan area.148 The 
same study also found, unsurprisingly, that school bus stops are the most re-
strictive category.149 The results demonstrated that a 1000-foot buffer zone that 
includes school bus stops as a restricted locale is, in effect, more restrictive 
than a 2000-foot buffer zone around only schools and childcare facilities.150 
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 143 See Grant Duwe et al., Does Residential Proximity Matter? A Geographic Analysis of Sex 
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Jill S. Levenson, Restricting Sex Offender Residences: Policy Implications, 36 HUM. RTS. 21, 22 
(2009). 
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A 2004 Colorado study further reinforced the ineffectiveness of residency 
restrictions as a tool for sex offender management.151 The study, performed by 
the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice, concluded that residency re-
strictions “may not deter the sex offender from re-offending and should not be 
considered as a method to control . . . recidivism.”152 Further, the study found 
that offenders who had a positive support system in place had “significantly 
lower numbers of [probation] violations.”153 
Research describing the unintended consequences of residency re-
strictions and expressing skepticism of their effectiveness is not hard to come 
by.154 What is often missing from the conversation, however, is a discussion 
about what actually does work to accomplish the goals of increasing public 
safety and reducing recidivism rates.155 Although early studies failed to sup-
port the idea that sex offender treatment resulted in lower recidivism rates, re-
cent research has been more promising.156 Results from a number of studies 
have concluded that recidivism rates are indeed lower among sex offenders 
who receive treatment, as compared to those who do not receive treatment.157 
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OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 4 (Mar. 15, 2004), http://www.csom.org/pubs/CO%20Residence%20
Restrictions%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE7S-K755]. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 5. 
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tempt to change offenders by modifying their behaviors. These approaches include be-
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Williams, supra note 43, at 49. 
 157 Hanson et al., supra note 156, at 186. The treatments referred to in this study were psycholog-
ical. Id. at 169. This study relied upon meta-analysis in order to produce a more statistically signifi-
cant result. Id. at 170. Meta-analysis allows researchers “to integrate many separate studies on [a] 
question into a single study. This practice allows [researchers] to draw general conclusions on [a] 
342 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:319 
Further, research indicates that “[s]ocial stability and support increase the like-
lihood of successful reintegration for criminal offenders,” and recidivism rates 
are lower among those who have a positive support system in their lives.158 
These findings, coupled with the immense negative consequences experienced 
by those subject to residency restrictions, suggest that there is significant room 
for improvement in how released sex offenders are managed.159 
Residency restrictions undeniably hindered the plaintiffs’ successful rein-
tegration in Doe v. Miami-Dade County.160 “John Doe #1” was unable to con-
tinue living at his sister’s home.161 “John Doe #2,” prohibited from residing 
with his aunt, was unable to find otherwise affordable housing.162 As of 2014, 
“John Doe #3” was employed, yet unable to find affordable housing that was 
in compliance with the Book Ordinance.163 Although the goals of residency 
restriction legislation are well intentioned, the existing literature and research 
increasingly urges a need for reform.164 The consequences of residency re-
strictions are substantial and real for those subject to their terms, whereas their 
efficacy is increasingly called into question.165 
C. Sex Offender Legislation & Residency Restrictions in Practice 
Sex offender legislation and residency restrictions have not successfully 
embodied or accomplished the goals they were intended to serve.166 The expe-
rience in Iowa following passage of new sex offender legislation exemplifies 
the shortcomings of residency restrictions.167 In 2002, the Iowa Legislature 
passed a law prohibiting registered sex offenders whose victims were minors 
from living within 2000 feet of any school or childcare center.168 The law went 
into effect in 2005 after a host of legal challenges, and the negative repercus-
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 165 See supra notes 134–159 and accompanying text. 
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 167 See id. at 279. 
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sions were evident almost immediately.169 Although many offenders were 
simply prevented from residing in entire communities, the more significant 
result was a considerable increase in the number of missing offenders.170 With-
in six months of the law’s enactment, the number of registered sex offenders in 
the state who could not be located more than doubled.171 Because the law se-
verely limited housing options for released offenders, many became “homeless 
or transient, making them more difficult to track and monitor.”172 The fallout 
of the legislation was so inimical that it led the Iowa County Attorneys Associ-
ation to issue a 2006 report calling for the law to be replaced by “more effec-
tive measures that do not produce [these] negative consequences.”173 One state 
legislator even stated that former legislative support for the residency re-
strictions was “a mistake.”174 
The unintended effects of residency restrictions are well documented.175 
Limited housing options and homelessness are clear consequences, but resi-
dency restrictions also exacerbate issues offenders face in their processes of 
reintegration.176 Financial instability, emotional stress, unemployment, psycho-
social stress, and relationship instability are among the many unfortunate, yet 
common, outcomes of residency restrictions.177 
The problems in Iowa have not gone unnoticed.178 In part due to the per-
ceived failure of Iowa’s residency restriction legislation, the Kansas Legisla-
ture in 2006 rejected a similar proposed statewide “buffer zone” law and also 
explicitly prohibited local municipalities from establishing their own local or-
dinances.179 This decision came after the Kansas Sex Offender Policy Board 
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submitted a report outlining that, although “residency restrictions are extreme-
ly popular with the general public,” they do not, in fact, increase public safety 
and, rather, have led to a number of unwanted consequences in other states.180 
The Kansas Legislature’s solution is rather unique in that it not only prevents 
local level ordinances from being implemented, but was based upon a rational 
review of the available information about residency restrictions.181 This ap-
proach demonstrates that not all states are willing to enforce blanket residency 
restrictions, especially in light of the mounting evidence that their costs signif-
icantly outweigh any perceived benefits. 
III. INCORPORATING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO CREATE MORE 
SENSIBLE POLICIES 
The development and implementation of federal sex offender legislation 
is grounded in the notion that the tracking of released sex offenders is benefi-
cial, and that the ability to notify communities of the presence of sex offenders 
contributes to an increase of awareness and public safety.182 Building upon 
these federally mandated registration systems are state and local level residen-
cy restrictions that severely limit where sex offenders may reside.183 Since 
their inception, however, these policies have lacked a basis in empirical data 
and have not been shown to be effective.184 
Over time, the detrimental repercussions of residency restrictions have 
become clear and the need for reform is evident.185 Legislators and citizens 
alike should reject the continued enforcement of these policies, which are 
predicated on false data and thus ill-suited to accomplish their stated goals.186 
Given the sensitive nature of child sexual assault, it would be overly idealistic 
to call for a total revocation of all residency restriction legislation.187 More 
                                                                                                                           
the Iowa County Attorneys Association report and concluding that “sex offender residence restrictions 
have no demonstrated efficacy as a means of protecting public safety”). 
 180 KAN. SEX OFFENDER POLICY BD., supra note 179, at 26, 28–29, 31. The Kansas governor and 
legislature created the Kansas Sex Offender Policy Board in 2006 for the purpose of researching poli-
cies and legislation “relating to the treatment, rehabilitation, reintegration and supervision of sex of-
fenders.” SPRAGUE ET AL., supra note 125, at 6–7. The January 2007 report was the result of a year-
long study, which culminated in its recommendations to the Kansas legislature. Id. at 7. 
 181 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 270. 
 182 See Jill Levenson, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions Impede Safety Goals, JURIST (Feb. 2, 
2012, 8:00 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/02/jill-levenson-sexoffenders-residency.php [http://
perma.cc/PB4S-CFL3]; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 80. 
 183 See Levenson, supra note 150, at 21–22. 
 184 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 278. 
 185 See id. at 278–85. 
 186 See id. at 285; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 118. 
 187 See Nobels et al., supra note 42, at 508; Cassie Dallas, Comment, Not in My Backyard; The 
Implications of Sex Offender Residency Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
1235, 1238 (2009); SPRAGUE ET AL., supra note 125, at 8 (noting that, “it is not good enough to simp-
ly tell communities not to enact residence restrictions”). 
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effective and sensible policy is, however, both possible and preferable.188 The 
practice of banishing sex offenders from living in large portions of any given 
community only compounds the problems faced by offenders seeking to rein-
tegrate into society.189 
Such a multifaceted problem calls for a multifaceted solution.190 Sensible 
legislative reform should offer more individualized assessments before impos-
ing residency restrictions, allow offenders to live with supportive family mem-
bers, and provide the data and tools needed for offenders to reliably determine 
when a residence is off limits.191 
A. Alternatives to Blanket Restrictions 
Although residency restrictions continue to be implemented and enforced 
throughout the country, statewide restrictions do not exist across the board.192 
There are multiple states that take a more individualized approach, rather than 
imposing blanket restrictions on all offenders.193 For example, in Texas, resi-
dency restrictions for registered sex offenders are determined on an individual, 
case-by-case basis by the Parole Board.194 Thus, the Parole Board can take into 
account whether an offender’s victim was a child and make an individual de-
termination regarding the necessity of restricting where an offender can re-
side.195 However, municipalities are not prohibited from adopting their own 
local residency restrictions.196 Because of this, the efficacy of the progressive 
approach taken by the Texas legislature is difficult to evaluate.197 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 285 (“Professionals and policymakers alike are encouraged to 
consider a range of options available for building safer communities and to endorse those that are 
most likely to achieve their stated goals while minimizing collateral consequences.”); Merriam, supra 
note 42, at 12, 13 (“[R]esidential restrictions should be largely eliminated for most of sex offenders 
. . . . Residency restrictions will not stop an offender from victimizing a family member or acquaint-
ance in their home . . . and will not keep an offender from getting access to a stranger.”). 
 189 See Levenson, supra note 182. 
 190 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 285; see also supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 191 See Levenson, supra note 8, at 285; see also infra notes 230–255 and accompanying text. 
 192 See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 106, at 17. 
 193 See id. at 17, 18. 
 194 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.187 (West 2011); see SPRAGUE ET AL., supra note 125, at 5. 
 195 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.187; Dallas, supra note 187, at 1264. Specifically, the 
Texas statute allows the Parole Board to establish a “child safety zone” for an offender. TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 508.187(b)(1). The imposition of a “child safety zone” prevents an individual offender 
from “go[ing] in, on, or within a distance specified by the [Parole Board] of premises where children 
commonly gather, including a school, day-care facility, playground, public or private youth center, 
public swimming pool, or video arcade facility.” Id. § 508.187(b)(1)(B). 
 196 See Dallas, supra note 187, at 1265. In addition to Texas, New Jersey does not have a 
statewide residency restriction, yet more than one hundred municipalities in the state had local re-
strictions until 2009. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 114; NIETO & JUNG, supra note 
106, at 21. However, these local level ordinances were challenged in G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway (Gal-
loway I), 951 A.2d 221, 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). The plaintiff in the case was a twenty-
year-old college freshman, who “had been adjudicated delinquent for an offense committed when he 
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Further, in Minnesota, the Parole Commissioner is responsible for deter-
mining if the highest risk offenders will be subject to a residency restriction as 
a condition of release.198 This more individualized approach, focusing on high- 
risk offenders, was implemented in Minnesota after the state legislature de-
clined to pass a statewide residency restriction for all offenders.199 Minnesota’s 
approach has been lauded as an “evidence-based practice[]” that more holisti-
cally assesses an offender’s level of dangerousness and implements conditions 
of release accordingly.200 
Likewise, Oregon has taken a more sensible and individualized approach 
to sex offender management.201 Oregon’s statute does not implement a strict 
residency restriction, but rather delegates power to its Department of Correc-
tions to promulgate rules to regulate the residences of released sex offend-
ers.202 The statute takes the position that the Department of Corrections “shall 
include in the rules . . . a general prohibition against allowing a sex offender to 
reside near locations where children are the primary occupants or users.”203 
Pursuant to this legislative mandate, the Oregon Administrative Rules (the 
“Rules”) reiterate this policy and prohibit certain classes of sex offenders from 
living near locales where children congregate.204 What is unique about the Or-
                                                                                                                           
was fifteen years old” with a thirteen-year-old victim. Id. at 224. After moving into a college dormito-
ry, he received notice requiring him to move out of the dorm within sixty days and find residency at 
least 2500 feet from his college campus, pursuant to a township ordinance. See id. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the statewide Megan’s Law preempted municipal level residency restrictions 
for sex offenders. G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway (Galloway II), 971 A.2d 401, 401 (N.J. 2009). 
 197 See Dallas, supra note 187, at 1268. 
 198 MINN. STAT. § 244.052(2)(e), (3)(k) (2012 & Supp. 2013); see NIETO & JUNG, supra note 106, 
at 17. 
 199 See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 106, at 18. The legislature decided not to enact a statewide 
restriction after reviewing the results of a study from the Minnesota Department of Corrections. See 
Ackerman & Terry, supra note 126, at 411–12. The study analyzed 224 recidivists, released between 
1990 and 2002, “who were reincarcerated for a sex crime prior to 2006.” MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., 
RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY & SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 1 (Apr. 2007), http://www.
csom.org/pubs/MN%20Residence%20Restrictions_04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity%20MN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y6D3-NZBE]. The study sought to determine whether residency restriction legisla-
tion would have affected these cases. See id. The study concluded that “not one of the 224 sex offens-
es would likely have been deterred by a residency restrictions law.” Id. at 2. 
 200 See Ackerman & Terry, supra note 126, at 409; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 11. 
An additional 2007 study conducted by the Minnesota Department of Corrections found that sexual 
recidivism rates decreased between 1990 and 2002, suggesting that Minnesota’s approach has been 
effective. See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 20 (2007); see 
Ackerman & Terry, supra note 126, at 413. 
 201 See OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642 (2013); see Justin Boyd, Comment, How to Stop a Predator: 
The Rush to Enact Mandatory Sex Offender Residency Restrictions and Why States Should Abstain, 86 
OR. L. REV. 219, 221 (2007). 
 202 OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642. 
 203 Id. §144.642(1). 
 204 OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009 (2012). Specifically, the rule states that “[a] sex offender classi-
fied as a sexually violent dangerous offender or a predatory sex offender may not reside near locations 
where children are the primary occupants or users.” Id. Neither the rule nor the statute specify a par-
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egon approach, however, is that the Rules provide a number of exceptions that 
a parole or probation officer may take into account when determining if an of-
fender’s residence is compliant with the statute.205 A parole or probation officer 
has the authority to allow for an exception to the general rule when the inter-
ests of “public safety and the rehabilitation of the offender” can be better 
served.206 The Rules state: 
In making this determination, the following factors must be considered: 
(a) Other residential placement options pose a higher risk to the 
community, or 
(b) An enhanced support system that endorses supervision goals and 
community safety efforts is available at this residence, or 
(c) Enhanced supervision monitoring will be in place (e.g. electronic 
supervision, curfew, live-in-care provider, along with community 
notification), or 
(d) The residence includes 24-hour case management, or 
(e) The offender is being released from prison unexpectedly and 
more suitable housing will be arranged as soon as possible. If any 
of these factors apply to the offender and the residence under re-
view, an exception to the permanent residence prohibition may be 
allowed.207 
This flexible rule maintains the general policy that sex offenders should 
not reside near locales where children congregate, yet allows for exceptions to 
ensure that offenders will not be forced into homelessness.208 This more indi-
vidualized approach, along with those of Minnesota and Texas, make clear that 
alternatives to blanket, statewide restrictions exist, and that broad restrictions 
have not been thoughtlessly implemented by all states.209 
                                                                                                                           
ticular buffer zone area where sex offenders may not reside, nor do they include a list of prohibited 
locales. See OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642; OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009. 
 205 See OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009(3). 
 206 See id. 
 207 See id. (emphasis added). 
 208 See id.; Boyd, supra note 201, at 243. The legislation was written with the intention of allow-
ing for parole officers to have broad discretion in approving residences. Boyd, supra note 201, at 243. 
As told by Darcey Baker, a former board member on the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision 
who helped draft the state statute, the legislation was influenced by the following situation: 
[A] sex offender resided in a home near a school and church. Although the community 
was enraged by the placement, the sex offender would have been homeless otherwise 
and perhaps would have fled elsewhere to find housing. Knowing the offenders loca-
tion, law enforcement officers could effectively monitor his actions. 
See id. 
 209 See SPRAGUE ET AL., supra note 125, at 5, 7. 
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Although little empirical data exists to date to demonstrate the impact of 
Oregon’s approach, there is more than enough evidence demonstrating that 
strict, uniform residency restrictions impede the goals they intend to serve.210 
Oregon’s approach should be lauded as a rational solution that promotes the 
policy of protecting children from sex offenders, balanced with the flexibility 
to ensure that the unintended and unnecessary consequences of residency re-
strictions do not inhibit offenders from successful reintegration.211 The Oregon 
experience further demonstrates that the goal of promoting the safety of chil-
dren does not necessitate irrational legislation based on flawed myths and as-
sumptions.212 
B. Encouraging Narrowly Tailored & Individualized Assessments 
All sex crimes are not the same.213 Likewise, all offenders are not the 
same and the circumstances surrounding their offenses vary greatly.214 Despite 
these variations, what is certain is that the headline-garnering incidents of sex 
offenses perpetrated by strangers do not represent the majority of sex crimes 
against children.215 Rather than continue to impose and enforce wide-reaching 
blanket restrictions, determining whether or not to impose a residency re-
striction on an offender as a condition of parole should be an individual as-
sessment.216 The totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime and vari-
ous risk assessment mechanisms should be used in making this determina-
tion.217 Most critically, this determination should be analyzed within a frame-
work supported by empirical data.218 
A majority of offenses are committed by an offender known to the vic-
tim.219 More sensible sex offender policies should begin by incorporating this 
known, baseline premise.220 Preventing released offenders from residing within 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See supra notes 134–159 and accompanying text. 
 211 See Boyd, supra note 201, at 245, 248. 
 212 See id. at 241; see also supra notes 201–208 and accompanying text. 
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 214 See Levenson, supra note 126, at 7. 
 215 See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 16, at 65; Merriam, supra note 42, at 4; see also supra 
notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
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 217 See Levenson, supra note 216, at 20. 
 218 See Nobels et al., supra note 42, at 506; Levenson, supra note 150, at 23. 
 219 See Merriam, supra note 42, at 4; see also supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Levenson, supra note 126, at 8; Merriam, supra note 42, at 4, 13. 
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a particular distance from certain locales where children congregate cannot 
reasonably lower the possibility of recidivism as it does not accurately address 
the reality of most offenses.221 It is not impossible to imagine a scenario in 
which subjecting an offender to a residency restriction would be a rational 
condition of release.222 Blanket restrictions, however, that fail to take into ac-
count any individualized factors should no longer be the norm in sex offender 
residency management.223 
In addition, residency restrictions should be imposed on a more individu-
alized basis in order to decrease the unintended consequence of homeless-
ness.224 In places such as Florida, released sex offenders have been left with 
minimal options for affordable and compliant housing.225 By so severely re-
stricting where offenders may reside, many have been forced into homeless-
ness.226 Given what is known about how expansive residency restrictions can 
be, this result is hardly surprising.227 Forcing offenders into homelessness un-
dermines the efficiency of sex offender legislation and risks increasing recidi-
vism rates.228 These results are unacceptable and at odds with the ultimate 
goals of sex offender legislation.229 
C. Making an Exception for Living with Family 
Included in the need for individualized assessment prior to imposing a 
residency restriction on a released sex offender is the need for certain excep-
tions and flexibility.230 Parole officers should have leeway in allowing for an 
offender to live with family members.231 Although sex offenders are far from a 
homogenous group, the available research consistently demonstrates that fami-
ly support increases “successful reintegration.”232 For example, the 2006 Iowa 
County Attorneys Association report, discussed previously, concluded that 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Levenson, supra note 150, at 21; Merriam, supra note 42, at 13. 
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 225 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 1; Levenson, supra note 150, at 22. 
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“[e]fforts to rehabilitate offenders and to minimize the rate of reoffending are 
much more successful when offenders are employed, have family and commu-
nity connections, and have a stable residence.”233 Given that sex offender leg-
islation has the ultimate aim of increasing public safety, more sensible policies 
should incorporate and promote this ideal.234 The opportunity to live with a 
supportive family member upon release has a multitude of benefits, including 
decreasing financial pressures and increasing stability during the difficult tran-
sition of reintegration.235 
There is a critical need for legislation that allows for individualized as-
sessments to be made in order to determine if the benefits of allowing an indi-
vidual offender to live with a family member outweigh the need to enforce a 
strict buffer zone in any particular scenario.236 Individual determinations are 
necessary to encourage sensible flexibility; common sense suggests that a low-
risk offender should be allowed to live with a supportive family member—
even if within 2000 feet of a school— rather than be forced into homeless-
ness.237 As previously discussed, Oregon’s model provides an example of how 
such legislation would work in practice and demonstrates that a compromise in 
legislation is feasible.238 The Oregon legislation maintains the position that 
preventing sex offenders from residing near locales where children congregate 
is preferred, yet allows for sensible exceptions to be made in order to avoid 
unreasonable results.239 
At least two of the plaintiffs in Doe v. Miami-Dade County could have 
greatly benefitted from an exception allowing them to reside with family 
members; all three plaintiffs would benefit from a policy that favors granting 
reasonable exceptions.240 Although “John Doe #1” and “John Doe #2” both 
had family members who were willing to provide housing for them, the loca-
tions of the housing violated residency restrictions and, as a result, they both 
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have struggled to find stable housing.241 Beyond being mandated to follow 
overly burdensome residency restrictions, they are also required to submit to 
extensive supervision conditions, including electronic monitoring and a daily 
curfew.242 Although “John Doe #3” did not have family to live with upon his 
release from jail, he was similarly subject to a daily curfew and, as of 2014, 
was unable to find affordable, compliant housing.243 Unable to afford rent 
payments at a compliant apartment close to his place of employment, “John 
Doe #3” was forced to sleep in his vehicle.244 
A model based upon the Oregon legislation would have allowed for a pro-
bation officer to approve the residences of “John Doe #1” and “John Doe #2” 
with family members under a number of exceptions listed in the Oregon Admin-
istrative Rules.245 Further, the Oregon model would give a probation officer the 
discretion to make an exception for “John Doe #3,” rather than leave him with 
no viable housing options.246 With stable and affordable housing, it is likely that 
these individuals would have a more realistic chance of successfully reintegrat-
ing into society, without the added burden of homelessness.247 
D. Increasing Certainty and Ability to Comply 
Where any residency restriction continues to be imposed on released sex 
offenders, a reliable database of up-to-date information about exactly what lo-
cations are prohibited is necessary.248 Released sex offenders face immense 
challenges in their efforts to reintegrate.249 As evidenced by the plaintiffs in 
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Doe v. Miami-Dade County, many offenders want to be compliant with the 
necessary terms.250 Compliance is hindered when interpretations regarding 
what constitutes prohibited locales are amorphous or data are unavailable.251 
States and municipalities should provide a database, updated at regular inter-
vals, that includes all locations deemed off-limits for offenders subject to resi-
dency restrictions, and offenders should be permitted to rely on these determi-
nations when seeking to establish their residences.252 
This combination of conditions allows for residency restrictions to be en-
forced in a more sensible manner, without placing an unreasonable burden on 
offenders.253 Further, these conditions lend more credibility to sex offender 
legislation by more practically sharing the liability between the state or local 
governing body and the offender.254 It is counterintuitive to continue to defend 
such policies on the basis of public safety, yet not provide the tools necessary 
for compliance.255 
CONCLUSION 
Sex offender legislation has been swiftly implemented in response to 
high-profile sex crimes against children, rather than as a result of careful re-
search and of the weighing of policy considerations. The reality is that most 
sex offenders do not victimize strangers and most sex offenders do not 
reoffend. Despite these facts, residency restrictions have been passed and en-
forced on state and local levels. Residency restrictions vary, but most prohibit 
sex offenders from residing within 500 to 2500 feet of schools and other places 
where children often congregate. Their expansive reach leaves sex offenders 
with extremely bleak housing options. 
Despite various legal challenges, residency restrictions persist. Rather 
than contributing to an increase in public safety, such policies have hindered 
sex offenders’ ability to reintegrate into society and have left many homeless. 
It is time for such policies to more sensibly reflect the empirical data. Residen-
cy restrictions cannot reasonably be expected to decrease incidents of child 
sexual assault because they do not reflect what is known about such offenses. 
Although complete abandonment of residency restrictions might not be realis-
tic at this time, certain reforms should be incorporated into state and local leg-
islation. Residency restrictions should be imposed on only high-risk offenders, 
rather than as a blanket condition imposed on all offenders equally. Certain 
individual determinations should be permitted in order to increase an offend-
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er’s chance of successful reintegration, including an exception to allow offend-
ers to live with supportive family members. Finally, where residency re-
strictions continue to be enforced, up-to-date information must be made avail-
able to offenders that allows them to locate compliant housing, and they must 
be able to rely on this data without fear of changing or ambiguous interpreta-
tions. 
Residency restrictions are not accomplishing the goals they were intended 
to serve. Furthermore, they create extreme hardships for those subject to their 
terms and may ultimately work against their intended goals by producing an 
abundance of unintended consequences. Reform is necessary to better serve the 
fundamental purpose of sex offender legislation—public safety—and to ensure 
offenders are given a realistic opportunity to successfully reenter society. 
  
 
